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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah 
Code Annotated Section 78-2a-3(2)(j). 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from the dismissal of Plaintiff's Complaint 
and denial of Plaintiff's motion for a new trial or to reopen the 
evidence by the trial court• 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. The trial court abused its discretion in failing to grant 
Plaintiff's motion at trial to reopen the evidence and Plaintiff's 
subsequent Motion for a New Trial or to Reopen the Evidence in 
that Plaintiff's failure to present the evidence on the remaining 
points was caused by confusing rulings of the Court and 
Defendants' counsel's failure to prepare orders within the scope 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
2. The trial court improperly ruled, as a matter of law, 
that Plaintiff had failed to prove certain conditions precedent to 
recovery when there was no issue at hand with respect to such 
conditions. 
3. The trial court improperly ruled, as a matter of law, 
that the burden was upon Plaintiff to show that Title 58A had been 
complied with when there was no evidence in the record that any 
payments had been made and that Defendants had adequately plead 
and proven the defense of estoppel and waiver. 
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DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Annotated, Title 38, Chapter 1, with respect to the 
mechanic's lien: and Title 14, Chapter 2, with respect to the 
bond: and Section 58A-la-9, with respect to the payments to the 
supplier: Addendum pages 1-6. 
Rule 9(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure with respect 
to the pleading of the failure of conditions precedent: Addendum 
pages 7-8. 
Rule 4-504 of the Utah Rules of Judicial Administration: 
Addendum page 9. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. Nature of the Case 
The Plaintiff, an electrical materials supplier, supplied 
materials to a sub-contractor for a building project known as the 
"Hunter Ward Project1' and were not paid for a substantial amount 
of such materials. Plaintiff complained against the Defendants 
for foreclosure of a mechanic's lien under Title 38, payment on a 
bond under Title 14 and an action in quantum meruit. The 
Defendants were the property owner, general contractor and bond 
underwriter. 
2. Course of the Proceedings 
Subsequent to the filing of the Complaint and Answer, both 
parties proceeded with discovery. Plaintiff then made a motion 
for summary judgment and a hearing was held on that matter. After 
additional discovery, Plaintiff filed a certificate of readiness 
for trial and trial was held on June 14, 1989. At the close of 
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Plaintiff's presentation of evidence, Defendants moved to dismiss 
Counts I and II of the Complaint on the basis that Plaintiff had 
failed to prove a prima facie case under Titles 38 and 14. After 
argument, that motion was granted and Plaintiff's motion to reopen 
the evidence was denied. 
Thereafter, the trial court granted Defendants attorney's 
fees. Plaintiff filed a motion for a new trial or to reopen the 
evidence. Upon submission to the court, that motion was denied. 
3. Description of the Disposition at Trial Court 
On Defendant's motion to dismiss at the close of Plaintiff's 
case, the trial court found that Plaintiff had failed to establish 
compliance with the notice requirements of Title 14, failed to 
establish compliance with the lien filing requirements of Title 38 
and failed to establish that Title 58A was complied with. The 
court then granted Defendant's motion to dismiss. 
Plaintiff's motion at trial to reopen the evidence and Count 
III of the Complaint were not addressed by the trial court. 
Plaintiff's subsequent motion for a new trial or to reopen the 
evidence was denied by the court without written comment. 
4. Statement of the Relevant Facts 
a- On March 11, 1987, Plaintiff filed a Complaint in this 
matter which contained three separate counts: (1) for foreclosure 
of a Mechanic's Lien pursuant to Utah Code Annotated ("U.C.A."), 
Title 38; (2) for payment pursuant to a theory of Quantum Meruit; 
and (3) for payment pursuant to a construction bond to U.C.A. 
Title 14. (Record at 2-12.) 
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b. The Complaint included one general allegation, in 
Paragraph #10 (Record at 4), with respect to having met the 
requirements of U.C.A. Title 38, Chapter 1, and several specific 
allegations with respect to such requirements as follows: 
(1) Paragraph *~ (Record at 3) specifically alleged 
that the requirement for having furnished the materials 
pursuant to U.C.A. Section 38-1-3 was met; and 
(2) Paragraph #10 (Record at 4) specifically alleged 
that the requirement for having filed the Lien in accordance 
with U.C.A. Section 38-1-7 was met; and 
(3) Paragraph #12 (Record at 4) specifically alleged 
that the requirements for having made dememd pursuant to 
U.C.A. Section 38-1-7 was met. 
(4) Paragraph #15 (Record at 5, 8-9) incorporated as 
part of the Complaint a copy of the Mechanic's Lien which was 
filed with the Complaint as an exhibit. 
(5) Paragraph #23 (Record at 6 and 10) incorporated as 
part of the Complaint a copy of the construction bond which 
was filed with the Complaint as an exhibit. 
c. On March 27, 1987, Defendants filed a single Answer (Record 
at 27) which denied, without further specifics, the allegations 
contained in Paragraphs 7 through 10, 11, 13 through 22 and 24 of the 
Complaint and which alleged two "affirmative defenses11: 
(1) That of Waiver and Estoppel (Record at 28); and 
(2) That of payment in full or failure to give proper 
credit for payment (Record at 28) . 
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d. The Answer contained no other specifics or particulars with 
respect to the denial of any of the other allegations of the Plaintiffs 
or with respect to the exhibits filed with the Complaint (Record at 27-
29) . 
e. On February 16, 1988, Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Summary 
Judgment (Record at 50, supported by the Affidavit of Gailen Hess, the 
President of Plaintiff, which included the following specific facts: 
(1) That Plaintiff filed a Lien on April 29, 1986 which 
was attached to the Affidavit as an exhibit (Hess Affidavit, 
Par. 3, Record at 62); and 
(2) That Plaintiff made demand on each of the 
Defendants by letter dated May 7, 1986 which was attached to 
the Affidavit as an exhibit (Hess Affidavit, Par. 4, Record 
at 62-63); and 
(3) That the invoices show that the first and last 
materials were furnished as stated in the Lien (Hess 
Affidavit, Par. #10 and 11, Record 63-64). 
f. On March 4, 1988, Defendants filed their opposition to 
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment which was supported by an 
affidavit which did not address any of the facts in Paragraph 5, above. 
(Record 160-163.) 
g. On April 4, 1988, a hearing on Plaintiff's Motion for Summary 
Judgment was held after which Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment 
was denied and Defendants' counsel was instructed to prepare the Order. 
(Record 170-171.) 
h. During such hearing, Plaintiff's counsel believed that the 
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Court had made the following rulings pursuant to Rule 56(d) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure ("U.R.C.P.") (Record 271-273): 
(1) That the only remaining issues for trial were (a) 
which of the invoiced items were actually used in the project 
and (b) which of the invoiced items had Plaintiff received 
payment for (Siegler Affidavit, Par. #5, Record at 272); and 
(2) That there were no questions of fact with respect 
to the validity of the Lien, the Notices and Demands and the 
timeliness of the filings of Lien and the filing of the 
Complaint (Siegler Affidavit, Par. #5, Record at 272). 
i. At the close of the hearing on Plaintiff's Motion for Summary 
Judgment, Plaintiff's counsel specifically requested clarification of 
the rulings which the Court had made pursuant to Rule 56(d) and was 
told by the Court "That's all I have to say". (Siegler Affidavit, Par. 
#6, Record at 272). 
j. Defendants' counsel apparently neglected to prepare, file and 
serve the Order with respect to the hearing on Plaintiff's Motion for 
Summary Judgment and the minute entry on the matter indicates only that 
the Motion was denied (Record at 171). 
k. In answer to Plaintiff's requests for production of documents, 
Defendants' counsel provided Plaintiff's counsel with the original 
files of Defendants' counsel in this matter. Such files included the 
originals of the notices and demands required by Titles 38 and 14 of 
the Utah Code Annotated. 
1. On April 24, 1989, a telephonic "Pre-Trial Conference" was 
held during which no mention of the issues to be tried was made and no 
-Page 11-
Pre-Trial Order resulted in an enumeration of the issues. 
m. On June 14, 1989, the trial in this matter was held. 
n. At the outset of the Trial, Plaintiff's counsel requested 
some clarification of the Court's rulings pursuant to Rule 56(d) as to 
the hearing on Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and was informed 
by the Court only that "The Motion had been denied" (Transcript of 
Trial at 3). 
o. At trial Plaintiff's counsel, in full belief that only two 
issues were to be tried and in the interest of not wasting the Court's 
and Counsels' time, presented Plaintiff's evidence that all of the 
invoiced materials were actually used in the project (Siegler 
Affidavit, Par. #7, Record at 272). 
p. At trial, a Stipulation was entered into that certain of the 
invoices and all of the payments which had been at issue were no longer 
at issue and would not be contested by either party (Transcript at 33). 
q. At trial Defendants' counsel cross-examined Plaintiff's 
witnesses with respect to the use of the materials in the project and 
certain of the account records of the Plaintiff (Transcript at 17). 
r. At trial no evidence was introduced with respect to any 
payments made by any person on any account with Plaintiff other than 
the payments involved in the Stipulation or with respect to any matter 
which could be considered to have concerned "Waiver" or "Estoppel" 
(Transcript at 33). 
s. At the close of the Plaintiff's presentation of evidence, 
Defendants moved for dismissal of Count I of the Complaint on the 
grounds that Plaintiff had not proven the contents or validity of the 
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lien or that the conditions of Title 38 had been met and Defendants 
moved for dismissal of Count III of the Complaint on the grounds that 
Plaintiff had not shown that Title 58A had been complied with. 
Defendants1 counsel stated at that time that he believed that 
Defendants would have to present evidence as to Count II of the 
Complaint if the Court found that Plaintiffs had proven, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, that the materials invoiced were used in 
the project (Transcript at 28-31) . 
t. In response to Defendants1 Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff's 
counsel argued as follows: 
(1) Counsel had been under the impression that all of 
the conditions precedent to the lien foreclosure and bond 
action had been previously found to have been proven 
(Transcript at 32); and 
(2) That if such was not the case, Plaintiff be 
permitted to reopen its case to prove those issues 
(Transcript at 33); and 
(3) That the burden of proving the matters under Title 
58A was on the Defendants and that no payments were in issue 
and no proof had been submitted with respect to the 
accounting for any payments (Transcript at 33); 
u. At the close of Plaintiff's response to Defendants1 Motion to 
Dismiss, Plaintiff's counsel requested that, should the Court decide 
that Plaintiff's counsel was incorrect with respect to the issues to be 
tried, Plaintiff be permitted to reopen its case in order to present 
evidence with respect to the remaining issues (Transcript at 33). 
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v. Neither the Court nor Defendants1 counsel stated that 
Plaintiff's counsel was incorrect with respect to its memory of events 
at the summary judgment hearing. 
w. Plaintiff had at trial, and has at this time, the means by 
which to prove the elements of its case which the Defendant claimed 
were not in evidence. (Affidavit of Siegler, Par. #9; Affidavit of 
Susan Carpenter, Par. #2-6, Record at 271-273 and 269-270) 
x. The Court, after taking the matter under advisement, stated 
its findings and conclusions as shown in the transcript of those 
proceedings and dismissed Plaintiff's action. 
y. On July 25, 1989, Plaintiff moved the Court for a New Trial or 
to Reopen the Evidence (Record at 274). 
2. Defendants1 counsel responded to such Motion but never stated 
that Plaintifffs counsel was incorrect with respect to its memory of 
events at the summary judgment hearing (Record at 284). 
aa. On August 8, 1989, Plaintiff's motion was denied and, on 
September 15, 1989, Plaintiff filed its Notice of Appeal (Record at 
300) . 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Due to the irregularity of the proceedings leading to trial, 
Plaintiff was not permitted to present all of its evidence to the trial 
court. Further, the trial court incorrectly ruled on several material 
issues of law which were determinative of the disposition of the 
action. 
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ARGUMENT 
1. Abuse of Discretion in Failure to Grant Hev Trial or Reopen 
Evidence. 
Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the 
Court may grant a new trial due to irregularity in the proceedings of 
the Court, insufficiency of evidence or error in law, among other 
reasons. 
While it is left to the broad discretion of the trial court to 
grant a new trial, in deciding whether to do so, the Court is required 
to determine both whether the moving party received a fair and just 
trial in the first instance fPrury v. Lunceford, 415 P.2d 662, 18 Utah 
2d 74 (1966)) and whether the moving party could prevail at a new 
trial. (Hansen v. Stewart, 761 P.2d 14, 17 (Utah 1988): H[A] new trial 
may be granted whenever there is evidence that would have permitted 
entry of a judgment for the losing party."; See also, Price-Orer 
Invest. Co. v. Rollins, Brown & Gunnel1, 713 P.2d 55 (Utah 1986), where 
the court stated: "[I]t appears that substantial evidence existed to 
justify the verdict in favor of [Appellant] Rollins, Brown. Under such 
circumstances, we must sustain the trial court's ultimate decision to 
grant a new trial.") 
In addition to these determinations, the Rules of Civil Procedure 
are to be interpreted, and these standards are to be applied, in such a 
manner that justice and fairness ultimately prevail. Further, pursuant 
to Rule 8 "[a] 11 pleadings shall be so construed as to do substantial 
justice." In Drury (supra, at 663) the Court stated that "The 
objective of all Rules of Procedure is that the parties have a full and 
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fair opportunity for a trial and determination of the issues in dispute 
between them." 
Fairness will ultimately prevail where a fair trial is had and 
where no prejudice occurs from the granting of a new trial. " [I]f no 
intervening rights have attached in reliance upon the judgment, and no 
actual injustice will ensue, the relief sought should be granted rather 
than denied. Here the motion was made in reasonable time, was timely 
made, and good reason appears for the relief requested." John J. Ming, 
Inc. v. District Court, 446 P.2d 907, 910 (Mont. 1970). 
In this action, the trial court erred in refusing to permit-
Plaintiff to present its full evidence and abused its discretion in 
refusing to grant Plaintiff a new trial in that: (1) Plaintiff's 
failure to present such evidence was caused by the irregularity in the 
proceedings of the trial court; and (2) Plaintiff was not required, by 
law, to present such evidence; and (3) Plaintiff was denied a fair 
trial on the facts due to the trial court's rulings. 
2. Irregularity in Proceedings and Accident or Surprise 
Pursuant to U.R.C.P. Rules 59 (a)(1) and (3), irregularity in the 
proceedings of the Court and accident or surprise are two of the 
grounds for granting a new trial. 
"Irregularity of proceedings" may include such occurrences as 
confusion of the parties as to orders, a change of ruling of the Court 
without adequate notice to the parties, ex parte proceedings, etc. 
In Williams v. Barber, 765 P.2d 887, (1988) the Utah Supreme Court 
granted a new trial to the Plaintiff based upon the confusion of 
Plaintiff over a ruling by the Court pursuant to Rule 56(d). The 
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Plaintiff in that case had "assumed" that such ruling had resolved 
certain issues in his favor and had not proceeded to prove such issues 
at trial. The trial court ruled against the Plaintiff, however, due to 
Plaintiff's failure to prove those very issues. In granting a new 
trial to the Plaintiff, the Utah Supreme Court stated in its conclusion 
that it was so ruling due to "the uncertainty and confusion of counsel 
for both parties at trial and the lack of clarity in the trial court's 
ruling on the relevance of evidence. . . . " In a concurring opinion, 
Justice Zimmerman stated the very matter at issue here: 
Apparently, during trial the Judge changed his mind . . . . 
Such a change of mind was entirely within the trial judge's 
power under Rule 56(c). However, he did not give counsel 
adequate notice of his change of mind. As a consequence, 
William's counsel was caught by surprise and . . . was 
unfairly prejudiced because his counsel was unprepared to 
proceed on that element. A remand for further proceedings on 
this point is therefore merited. 
Id. at 891. 
In the instant case, four occurrences may be termed 
"irregularities": (1) the failure of Defendants' counsel to produce 
the Order with respect to the Motion for Summary Judgment; (2) the 
statement of the Court that no findings were made pursuant to Rule 
56(d) on Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment; (3) the Court's 
dismissal of Plaintiff's Quantum Meruit claim without any motion 
therefor; and (4) the Court's failure to permit Plaintiff to reopen its 
case despite a request to do so. The first and second of these 
occurrences also resulted in prejudicial surprise to the Plaintiff 
which the Plaintiff tried diligently to avoid. 
Rule 4-504 of the Rules of Judicial Administration, and its 
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predecessor which was in effect at the time, would have required 
Defendants1 counsel, in accordance with the Court's instructions, to 
prepare the Order within 15 days of the hearing. This Order was not 
filed or served at all. 
Rule 56(d) provides that, where a Motion for Summary Judgment does 
not dispose of all of the issues, the Court shall make findings and 
narrow the issues for trial where practicable. Such an Order, while 
sometimes referred to as "Partial Summary Judgment" can also be 
referred to by other names since, as stated in Clouser v. Spaniol Ford, 
Inc. , 522 P.2d 1360, 1362 (Wyo. 1974), "this is a misnomer and might 
more properly be described as an Interlocutory Order or a Partial 
Summary Adjudication, narrowing the scope of the trial and defining the 
issues". As such, the Order "should be entered sufficiently ahead of 
time to allow for litigants to prepare for the trial." Id. at 1364. 
While, pursuant to Rule 52, the Court is not required to produce 
an Order with respect to a ruling on a Motion for Summary Judgment the 
failure to do so, or the failure to enter accurate, clear and concise 
findings, has often been the cause for the granting of a new trial. 
See, e.g., Williams v. Barber, supra; Clouser v. Spaniol Ford, Inc., 
supra; and Calvert & Marsh Coal Co., Inc. v. Pass, 393 So. 2d 955 (Ala. 
1980). 
In the instant case, despite the fact that the Court did not 
credit Plaintiff's counsel with accurately remembering the findings of 
the Court on Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, it is evident 
that the failure of the Court and of Defendants1 counsel to produce an 
Order in that regard is the cause of Plaintiff's counsel's failure to 
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present the further evidence which the Court apparently would have 
required in Plaintiff's case. This is evident in that: (a) Plaintiff's 
counsel requested a clarification of this issue more than once prior to 
the trial's beginning; (b) Plaintiff could have clearly proven the 
items which the Defendant contended were not in evidence; and (c) 
Plaintiff's counsel put on proof only with respect to the facts which 
it believed remained in issue. 
Whether Plaintiff's counsel accurately remembered the events has 
become irrelevant in that the confusion which resulted from the lack of 
a written Order and from the lack of clarification of the Court's 
rulings caused Plaintiff to fail to produce the competent evidence 
which it possessed and, thus, caused the Court to dismiss Plaintiff's 
Complaint. Indeed, just as in the Williams case, "At the end of the 
trial, during the announcement of its rulings, Appellant's counsel 
expressed surprise" at the Court's ruling due to the confusion and 
uncertainty caused by the irregularity of the Court's prior 
proceedings. (Williams, at 890.) See also, Calvert & Marsh, supra, 
describing the actions needed to be taken, and taken by Plaintiff in 
this matter, to attempt to avoid such a situation. 
Indeed, Plaintiff's counsel was further surprised when the Court 
ruled that, even though Plaintiff had shown that it had supplied 
materials for the project in question and even though there had been no 
evidence presented with respect to the payment for those materials and 
even though Defendants did not move to dismiss Count II of the 
Complaint, the Court proceeded to dismiss Count II. 
It was a further error of the Court not to permit Plaintiff, 
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pursuant to the request of Plaintiff's counsel, to reopen its case in 
order to introduce the evidence which the Court determined was lacking 
at that time. It was clear from the Plaintiff's previous pleadings and 
from Plaintiff's response to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss that 
Plaintiff had not introduced such evidence because it had been under 
the impression that it was unnecessary and would be a waste of time and 
redundant. Ertman v. City of Olvmpia, 621 P.2d 724 (Wash. 1980). 
3. Errors of Law 
Pursuant to U.R.C.P. Rule 59(a)(7), error in law is one of the 
grounds for granting a new trial. The Utah Supreme Court has regarded 
this subsection as one of the most important reasons for granting a new 
trial. In Dotv, et al. v. Town of Cedar Hills, 656 P.2d 993, 997 
(1982), the Court stated: "Thus, because of the errors of law by the 
trial court in granting summary judgment against the Defendant, the 
subsequent denial by the trial court of the Defendants1 Motion to Amend 
Judgment or for a New Trial was an abuse of discretion which compounded 
rather than cured the original errors." 
In the instant case, there were three errors in law, each of which 
significantly prejudiced the Plaintiff and each of which entitles 
Plaintiff to a new trial: (1) the Court erroneously ruled that the 
Plaintiff had not proven that it had met the conditions of Titles 38 
and 14 with respect to the filing of the lien, the filing of the 
Complaint, the notice requirements and the demand requirements; and (2) 
the Court erroneously ruled that "the burden is on the Plaintiff tc 
establish . . . that title 58-50-10 was complied with" and that that 
burden had not been met; and (3) that Defendants had adequately plead 
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and proven estoppel and waiver. 
The Court erroneously ruled that the Plaintiff did not meet its 
burden to establish evidence of compliance with Section 14-2-1 
regarding notice and that a valid lien was filed in compliance with 
Section 38-1-10. In fact, such compliance had been established by the 
original Complaint and Answer and had not been in issue thereafter. 
Rule 9(c) of the U.R.C.P. states: 
In pleading the performance or occurrence of conditions 
precedent, it is sufficient to aver generally that all 
conditions precedent have been performed or have occurred. A 
denial of performance or occurrence shall be made 
specifically and with particularity, and when so made the 
party pleading the performance or occurrence shall on the 
trial establish the facts showing such performance or 
occurrence. 
As cited in Runnemede Owners, Inc. v. Crest Mortg. Corp., 861 F.2d 
1053, 1057 (7th Cir. 1988), C. Wright and A. Miller, Federal Practice 
and Procedure, 1302 and 1304 states: 
Rule 9(c) is designed to eliminate the detailed and 
largely unnecessary averments that resulted under the common 
law procedure, and to prevent nonmeritorious dismissals for 
failure to plead the underlying fulfillment of conditions 
precedent that are not at issue in the suit. . . . 
[B]ut, [a] party who intends to controvert the 
claimant's general allegation of performance is . . . given 
the burden of identifying those conditions he believes are 
unfulfilled and wishes to put into issue; he cannot raise an 
issue of performance by a general denial. •• 
It is axiomatic that in generally alleging performance of 
conditions precedent, the Plaintiff need not use the exact language of 
the rule but may so otherwise generally allege such occurrence. See, 
e.g., Rosales v. AT&T Information Systems, Inc., 702 F.Supp. 1489 (D. 
Colo. 1988); Guthrie v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co., 208 S.E. 2d 60 
(W.V. 1974); and Johnson v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. of Hartford, 60S P.2d 
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1299 (Wyo. 1980), aff'd 630 P.2d 514, cert. den. 454 U.S. 1118. 
Indeed, the general allegation may be couched in terms of having 
performed under the law or having complied with a statute. Mutuelle 
Generale Francaise Vie v. Life Assur. Co., 688 F.S. 386 (N.D. 111. 
1988). See also, Redevelopment Comm'n of City of Washington v. Grimes, 
178 SE 2d 345 (N.C. 1971). 
The Courts, both Federal and State, have ruled time and time again 
that the effect of this rule is that the failure to plead such denial 
with specificity and particularity results in the waiver of the 
defense. Fort Howard Paper Company v. Standard Havens, Inc., 119 
F.R.D. 397 (E.D. Wis. 1988); Royal McBee Corporation v. Bryant, 217 
A.2d 603 (D.C. 1966); Mattson v. Julian, 678 P.2d 654, 209 Mont. 48 
(Mont. 1984), aff'd 710 P.2d 707 (1985); and Marcotte v. Harrison, 443 
A.2d 1225 (R.I. 1982). Some courts have phrased it in such a way that 
the failure to deny with specificity and particularity is an admission 
that such conditions were fulfilled. 
In Treasure State Industries v. Leigland, 151 Mont. 288, 
443 P. 2d 22, decided after Montana's adoption of Rule 9(c), 
we stated: 
'The conditions precedent referred to in this rule 
are those the performance or occurrence of which 
are prerequisite to a claim upon which relief can 
be granted. In most instances there is no question 
of the performance of conditions precedent and Rule 
9(c) thus puts the burden on the defendant to raise 
the issuer when there is actually a question. 
Under this rule a general denial will not put the 
performance or occurrence of any condition in 
issue.' . . . 
Other authorities are in agreement with the Treasure 
State Industries rule. 1 Moore's Federal Practice Rules 
Pamphlet Par. 9.3[3] (1984); McKee-Berger-Mansueto v. Board 
of Education (7th Cir. 1980), 626 F.2d 559. 
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. No specific denial of any condition precedent 
appears in Julian's pleadings. Julian never moved to amend 
his pleadings or for a continuance despite the lengthy period 
between the filing of pleadings and trial. Having failed to 
plead denial of a condition precedent with specificity or 
particularity, Julian's testimony of alleged defective 
performance and failure to correct was properly rejected. 
[Citations omitted.] 
. . .In either case Julian failed to follow the simple 
pleading procedures designed to give notice to the opposing 
party and to narrow the issues for trial. 
Mattson. at 657-8. 
The Courts have further agreed that the "mere assertion of 
'failure to state a claim' was not specific enough to join the issue." 
Brooks v. Monroe Systems For Business, Inc., 873 F.2d 202 (8th Cir. 
1989)f rehearing denied June 5, 1989. 
Plaintiff generally plead all of the conditions precedent to the 
foreclosure of the Mechanic's Lien and to the filing of .the Complaint 
on the Bond and Defendant failed to deny the performance or occurrence 
of any of these conditions specifically and with particularity as 
required by Rule 9(c). In fact, the only items in Defendants' Answer 
which were specific and particular, if any, were the second and third 
affirmative defenses, neither of which dealt with any of these issues. 
In fact, Defendants did not raise such issues even in opposition 
to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment. As in Treasure State 
Industries, supra, there is the additional problem that the Defendant, 
throughout the proceedings failed to produce any evidence that any of 
these conditions had not been met. In fact, "[t]he [Defendant] never 
raised the issue until it made its motion to dismiss at the end of the 
. . . hearing — after filing its answer, after stipulating to the 
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severance of the damage issue from the equitable issues, after 
stipulating to an agreed statement of facts that listed the costs 
incurred by Mesolella • . . ". Mesolella v. City of Providence, 508 
A.2d 661, 666 (R.I. 1986). 
Therefore, Plaintiff was not required to present any evidence at 
trial as to these matters since they were not in issue. In Sullivan v. 
McCarthy, 314 P.2d 901, 902, (Colo. 1957), the Court stated: 
Rule 9(c) . . . permits a Plaintiff to plead generally the 
performance of all conditions. If an adverse party denies 
the performance of any such conditions the rule requires that 
such denial "shall be made specifically and with 
particularity." Thus specific issues are framed, and the 
Plaintiff, while obligated to establish the performance of 
those conditions within the framed issues, is under no 
obligation to prove the performance of conditions other than 
those with reference to which Defendant has specifically 
alleged failure to perform. 
In fact, Defendants assertion of the defense with respect tc 
lack of notice pursuant to the statutes would have been frivolous and 
asserted in bad faith as shown by their own files. 
Title 58A provides, in essence, that when a materialman is 
providing materials for a subcontractor on more than one project the 
materialman must demand to know which project any payment from the 
contractor, property owner or subcontractor is for and must credit the 
proper project or it is a defense to the claim that "a payment made, by 
the owner to the contractor for the materials has been so designated, 
and paid over to the subcontractor or materialman, and that when the 
payment was received by the subcontractor or materialman he did not 
demand a designation of the account and of the items of account tc 
which the payment was to be applied." 
The Utah Supreme Court, in Western Ready Mix Concrete Co. v« 
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Rodriguez. 567 P.2d 1118, 1120 (1977), affirmed in Geneva Pipe Company 
v. S & H Insurance Company (January 21, 1986 slip opinion) interpreted 
this section of the statute as follows: 
The statute set out is plain and the meaning is clear• 
If an owner has more than one property being improved by the 
same contractor, he must designate which property is to be 
credited when he makes a payment to the contractor . . . when 
a contractor has an account with a materialman, which 
includes material furnished to jobs other than that of an 
owner who pays the contractor, the statute requires that 
materialman to make inquiry as to the job to be credited for 
any money paid by the contractor." (Emphasis added.) 
Since it is a defense, the contractor must show that a payment 
made was either: (1) not specifically designated and the materialman 
did not demand such designation; or (2) was designated and was credited 
to the wrong account. 
Since no evidence was submitted with respect to payments, other 
than the payments which were stipulated as properly applied, no prima 
facie case was made that such a defense even existed and Plaintiff was 
not required to address the defense in its case. In fact, no such 
evidence could have been adduced had the burden been properly placed on 
the Defendants because no such evidence exists. 
The Court's finding that the burden was on the Plaintiff to show 
that it had complied with Title 58A was erroneous and its dismissal 
with respect to the failure of proof in this matter was erroneous 
because there is no proof in the record or elsewhere that any payment 
was not designated or was incorrectly credited. The Defendants "proof" 
consisted of internal bookkeeping records of the Plaintiff which, 
Defendants admitted, were not the only records kept by the Plaintiff 
and represented internal accounts only. 
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In their Answer, Defendants plead the defenses of "waiver and 
estoppel" based upon an alleged conversation which took place between 
an employee of one of the Defendants and an employee of the Plaintiff 
in October of 1985. 
Triple I Supply, Inc. v. Sunset Rail, Inc., 652 P.2d 1298, 1301-
1302 (Utah 1982) presented a set of circumstances very similar to those 
of this case in this regard. In that case, the Defendant argued "that 
Plaintiff is estopped from asserting its claim under the bonding 
statute because of its failure to give timely Notice of Default to 
Defendant and its extension of credit to Bell Construction after 
default." The Court rejected that argument and stated: 
The doctrine of estoppel applies when one party 
knowingly induces another by some act or admission to take a 
detrimental course of action. Defendant acknowledges that 
there had been no contact or communication between itself and 
Plaintiff. Without contact or communication of any kind, 
Plaintiff could not have communicated or induced Defendant 
into any type of detrimental conduct." 
Even taking Defendants1 evidence on this point in its best light 
and without taking into account its credibility or accuracy, such 
evidence merely indicates two things: (1) that the Plaintiff regarded 
the account of Old Trapper Electric as "current" at the time of the 
conversation; and (2) that thereafter Defendant Inkley began paying the 
Old Trapper Electric account by joint check. 
Even the Defendants do not allege that on the date of the 
supposed conversation Old Trapper Electric did not owe any monies to 
the Plaintiff and the Plaintiff has testified that, in fact, th6 
account in question was only a matter of days from being deemed 
delinquent. 
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Thus, the statement which may have been made by an employee of 
the Plaintiff may have been misconstrued by an employee of the 
Defendant. 
However, misconstrued or not, the fact is that the statement did 
not induce any behavior: the change in the behavior of Defendant Inkley 
was to further protect itself by using joint payments to the 
subcontractor and materialman, rather than to change its behavior 
toward a more risky position. 
Thus, on its face and pursuant to the evidence provided by the 
Defendants, such a defense must fall under the standards of Triple I, 
supra, and the remaining case law. See also Estate of Christensen v. 
Christensen, 655 P.2D 646 (Utah 1982). 
CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT 
In summation, Plaintiff submits that the trial court committed 
material errors in denying Plaintiff's motions for the reopening of the 
evidence and in denying Plaintifffs motion for a new trial and in 
making material errors in its legal conclusions such that the 
disposition of this case was not the disposition which this system of 
legal justice requires. 
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Respectfully submitted on this 15th day of January, 1990. 
/s/ Lora C. Siegler 
Lora C. Siegler 
Attorney for Appellant 
1399 South 700 East, Suite #12 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84105 
(801) 484-5570 
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LIENS 
Chapter 
1 Mechanics' Laens 
2 Miscellaneous Liens 
3 Lessors' Liens 
4 Common Carriers' Liens 
5 Judgment Lien — United States Courts 
6 Federal Tax Liens 
7 Hospital Lien Law 
8 Self-service Storage Facilities 
9 Penalty for Wrongful Lien 
10 Oil, Gas and Mining Liens 
CHAPTER 1 
MECHANICS' LIENS 
Section 
38-1-1 Public buildings not subject to act 
38-1-2 "Contractors* and "subcontractors* de-
fined. 
38-1-3 Those entitled to ben — What may be at-
tached 
38-1-4 Amount of land affected — Lots and subdi-
visions — Franchises, fixtures, and ap-
purtenances 
38-1-5 Pnonty — Over other encumbrances 
38-1-6 Pnonty over claims of creditors of ongmal 
contractor or subcontractor 
38 1-7 Notice of claim — Contents — Recording — 
Service on owner of propert> 
38-1-8 Liens on several separate properties in one 
claim 
38-1-9 Notice imparted by record 
38-1-10 Laborers' and matenalmen's hen on equal 
footing regardless of time of filing 
38-1 11 Enforcement — Time for — Lis pendens — 
Action for debt not affected. 
38-1-12 Repealed. 
38-1-13 Parties — Joinder — Intervention 
38-1-14 Decree — Order of satisfaction 
38-1-15 Sale — Redemption — Disposition of pro-
ceeds 
38-1-16 Deficiency judgment 
38-1 17 Costs — Apportionment — Costs ana attor-
neys' fee to subcontractor 
38-1-18 Attorneys' fees 
38-1-19 Payment b\ owner to contra etc1* — Subcon 
tractors hen not affected 
38-1-20 When contract pnee not payable in cash — 
Notice 
38-1-21 Advance payments — Effect on subcontrac-
tor's ben 
38-1-22 Advance payments under terns of contract 
— Effect on bens 
38-1-23 Creditors cannot reach matenais fur 
nished, except ftr purchas-e pnee 
38 1-24 Cance' anon of reco^ c — Pena *\ 
3&-1 25 Abuse of hen ngrn — Pena~:\ 
38-1-26 Assignment of ben 
ADDENDUM 
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Section 
38-1-27. Preliminary notice — Form of Dotice — 
Contents of nouce — Notice of com-
mencement — County clerks to main-
tain, index file — Payment of fees 
38-1-1. Public buildings not subject to act 
The provisions of this chapter shal not apply to 
any public building, structure or improvement isss 
38-1-2. "Contractors" and nsubcon tractors" de-
fined. 
Whoever shall do work or furnish materials by con-
tract, express or implied with, the owner, as in this 
chapter provided shaL be deemed an original con-
tractor, and all other persons doing work or furnish-
ing materials shall be deemed subcontractors. ISSS 
38-1-3. Those entitled to ben — What may be 
attached. 
Contractors, subcontractors, and all persons per-
forming any services or furnishing or renting any 
materials or equipment used in the construction, al-
teration, or improvement of any building or structure 
or improvement to any premises in any manner and 
licensed architects and engineers and artisans who 
have furnished designs, plats, plans, maps, specifica-
tions, drawings, estimates of cost, surveys or superin-
tendence, or who have rendered other like profes-
sional service, or bestowed labor, shall have a hen 
upon the property upon or concerning which they 
have rendered service, performed labor, or furnished 
or rented materials or equipment for the value of the 
service rendered, labor performed, or materials or 
equipment furnished or rented by each respectively, 
whether at the instance of the owner or of any other 
person acting by his authority as agent, contractor, or 
otherwise. This lien shall attach only to such interest 
as the owner may have in the property. i&87 
38-1-4. A m o u n t of land affected — Lots and sub-
divis ions — Franchises , fixtures, and 
appurtenances . 
The liens granted by this chapter shall extend to 
and cover so much of the land whereon such building, 
structure, or improvement shall be made as may be 
necessary for convenient use and occupation of the 
land. In case any such building shall occupy two or 
more lots or other subdivisions of land, such lots or 
subdivisions shall be considered as one for the pur-
poses of this chapter. Tne liens provided for in this 
chapter shall attach to all franchises privileges, ap-
purtenances, and to all machinery and fixtures, per-
taining to or used in connection with any such lands, 
buildings, structures, or improvements. 1987 
38-1-5. Priori ty — Over other e n c u m b r a n c e s . 
The Hens herein provided for shall relate back to, 
and take effect as of, the time of the commencement 
to do work or furnish materials on the ground for the 
structure or improvement, and shall have priority 
over any hen, .mortgage or other encumbrance which 
may have attached subsequently to the time when 
the building, improvement or structure was com-
menced, work begun, or first material furnished on 
the ground; also over any lien, mortgage or other en-
cumbrance of which the hen holder had no notice and 
which was unrecorded at the time the building, struc-
ture or improvement was commenced, work begun, or 
first material furnished on the ground. 1&53 
38-1-6. Priority over claims of creditors of origi-
nal contractor or subcontractor. 
No attachment, garnishment or levy under an exe-
cution upon any money due to an original contracior 
from the owner of any property subject to Hen under 
this chapter shall be valid as against any ben of a 
subcontractor or materialmsji, and no such attach-
ment, garnishment or levy upon any money due to s 
subcontractor or materialman from the contractor 
shall be valid as against any hen of a laborer em-
ployed by the day or piece. 1955 
38-1-7. Not ice of claim — Contents — Recording 
— Service on owner of property. 
(1) Each contractor or other person who claims the 
benefit of this chapter within 80 days after substan-
tial completion of the project or improvement shall 
file for record with the county recorder of the county 
in which the property, or some part of the proper: y. u 
situated, a written notice to hold and t:\n\m a lien. 
(2) This notice shall contain a statement setting 
forth the following information: 
(a) the name of the reputed owner if known or, 
if not known, the name of the record owner: 
(V> the name of the person by whom he was 
employed or to whom he furnished the equipment 
or material; 
(c) the time when the first and last labor or 
service was performed or the first and last equip-
ment or material wa* furnished; 
(d i a description of rcne property, sufficient for 
identification; and 
(e) the signature of the Hen claimant or his 
authorized agent and an acknowledgment or cer-
tificate as required under Chapter 3, Title 57. No 
acknowledgment or certificate is required for any 
notice filed after April 29,1985, and before April 
. . 24, 1989. 
(3) Within 30 days after filing the notice of lien. 
the Hen claimant shall deliver or mail by certified 
mail to either the reputed owner or record owner of 
the real property a copy of the notice of lien. If the 
record owner's current address is not readily avail-
able, the copy of the claim may be mailed to the last-
known address of the record owner, using the names 
and addresses appearing on the last completed real 
property assessment rolls, of the county where the af-
fected property is located. Failure to deliver or mail 
the notice of lien to the reputed owner or record 
owner precludes the hen claimant from an award of 
costs and attorneys' fees against the reputed owner or 
record owner in an action to enforce the hen. 1989 
38-1-8. Liens on several separate properties in 
one claim. 
Liens against two or more buildings or other im-
provements owned by the same person may be in-
cluded in one claim; but in such case the person filing 
the claim must designate the amount claimed to be 
due to him on each of such buildings or other im-
provements, m: 
38-1*9. Not ice imparted by record. 
(1) The recorder must record the claim in an index 
maintained for that purpose. 
(2) From the time the claim is filed for record, all 
persons are considered to have notice of the claim. 
1S8-
38-1-10. Laborers' and materialmen's hen on 
equal footing regardless of time of fil-
ing. 
The liens for work and labor done or materia1 fur-
nished as provided in this chapter shall be upon ar. 
equal footing, regardless of date of filing the notici 
391 LIENS 38-1-23 
and claim of hen and regardless of the time of per-
forming such work and labor or furnishing such me 
tenal IKS 
38-1-1L Enforcement — Time for — Lis pendens 
— Action for debt not affected. 
Actions to enforce the liens herein provided for 
must be begun within twelve months after the com 
pletion of the original contract, or the suspension of 
work thereunder for a period of thirty days Within 
the twelve months herein mentioned the hen claim 
ant shall file for record with the county recorder of 
each county in which the hen is recorded a notice of 
the pendency of the action, in the manner provided in 
actions affecting the title or right tc possession of real 
property, or the hen shal be void except as to per-
sons who have been made parties to the action and 
persons having actual knowledge of the commence-
ment of the action, and the burden of proof shall be 
upon the hen claimant and those claiming under him 
to show such actual knowledge Nothing herein con-
tained shall be construed to impair or affect the right 
of any person to whom a debt may be due for any 
work done or materials furnished to maintain a per-
sonal action to recover the same 1953 
38-1-12. Repea led . issi 
38-1-13. Parties — Joinder — Intervention. 
Lienors not contesting the claims of each other may 
join as plaintiffs, and when separate actions are com-
menced the court may consolidate them and make all 
persons having claims filed parties to the action 
Those claiming hens who fail or refuse to become par-
ties plaintiff mav be made parties defendant, and anv 
one not made a party may at any time before the final 
hearing intervene 1953 
38-1-14. Decree — Orde r of sa t i s fac t ion . 
In even* case in which liens are claimed against the 
same property the decree shall provide for their satis-
faction in the following order 
(1) subcontractors who are laborers or me-
chanics working by the dav or piece, but without 
furnishing materials therefor, 
(2 all other subcontractors and all material-
men. 
(3) the original contractors 1953 
38-1-15. Sale — Redemption — Disposition of 
proceeds 
The court shall cause the propertv to be sold m 
satisfaction of the hens and costs as in the case of 
foreclosure of mortgages subject to the same ngnt of 
redemption If the proceeds of sale after the payment 
of costs shall not be sufficient to satisfy the whole 
amount of liens included in the decree, then such pro-
ceeds shah be paid in the order above designated, and 
pro rata to the persons claiming in each class where 
the sum realized is insufficient to pav the persons of 
such class in full Any excess shall be paid to the 
owner 1953 
38-1-16. Deficiency j u d g m e n t 
Every person s&ose claim is not satisfied as herein 
provided may have judgment docketed for the balance 
unpaid, and execution therefor against the party per-
sonally liable 1953 
38-1-17. Costs — Apportionment — Costs and 
attorneys' fee to subcontractor. 
As between the owner and the contractor the court 
shall apportion the costs according to the right of the 
case, but in all cases each subcontractor exhibiting a 
lien shall have his costs awarded to him, including 
the costs of preparing and recording the notice of 
claim of lien and such reasonable attorney's fee as 
may be incurred in preparing and recording said no-
tice of clajn of hen. 1961 
38-1-18. A t to rneys ' fees. 
In an> action brought to enforce any lien under this 
chapter the successful party shall be entitled to re-
cover a reasonable attorneys' fee, to be fixed by the 
court which shall be taxed as costs in the action 
1961 
38-1-19. Payment by owner to contractor — 
Subcontractor's ben not affected. 
When any subcontractor shall have actually begun 
to furnish labor or materials for which he is entitled 
to a hen no payment to the original contractor shall 
impair or defeat such hen, and no alteration of anv 
contract shall affect any hen acquired under the pro-
visions of this chapter 1953 
38-1-20. When cont rac t p r i ce no t p a y a b l e in 
cash — Notice. 
As to all liens except that of the contractor, the 
whole contract price shall be payable in money, ex-
cept as herein provided, and shall not be diminished 
by any prior or subsequent indebtedness, offset or 
counterclaim in favor of the owner and against the 
contractor except when the owner has contracted to 
pay otherwise than in cash, in which case the owner 
shall post in a conspicuous place on the premises a 
statement of the terms and conditions of the contract 
before materials are furnished or labor is performed, 
which notice must be kept posted, and when so posted 
shall give notice to all parties interested of the terms 
and conditions of the contract Any person willfully 
tearing down or defacing such notice is guilty of a 
misdemeanor. 1953 
38-1 -21. Advance payments — Effect on subcon• 
tractor's lien. 
No payment made prior to the time when the same 
is due under the terms and conditions of the contra a 
shall be valid for the purpose of defeating, diminish-
ing or discharging any lien m favor of any person 
except the contractor, but as to any such hen such 
payment shall be deemed as if not made, notwith-
standing that the contractor to whom it was paid may 
thereafter abandon his contract or be or become in-
debted to the owner for damages for nonperformance 
of his contract or otherwise 1953 
38-1-22. Advance payments under terms of con-
tract — Effect on liens. 
The subcont^actors, hens provided for in this chap-
ter shall extend to the full contract price, but if at the 
time of the commencement to do work or furnish ma-
terials the owner has paid upon the contract, in accor-
dance with the terms thereof, any portion of the con-
tract price, either in money or property, the lien of 
the contractor shall extend only to such unpaid bal-
ance, and the lien of any subcontractor who has no-
tice of such payment shall be limited to the unpaid 
balance of the contract price No part of the contract 
price shall by the terms of any contract be made pay -
able, nor shall the same or any part thereof be paid in 
advance of the commencement of the work for the 
purpose of evading or defeating the provisions of this 
chapter isss 
38-1-23. Creditors cannot reach materials fur-
nished, except for purchase price. 
Whenever materials have been furnished for use in 
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the construction, alteration or repair of any building, 
work or other improvement mentioned in Section 
38-1-3 such materials shall not be subject to attach-
ment, execution or other legal process to enforce am 
debt due by the purchaser of such materials , other 
than a debt due for the purchase money thereof so 
long as in goc>d faith the same are about ic be applied 
to the construction, alteration or repair of sucr. build 
ing or improvement isss 
38-1-24. Cancel la t ion of r eco rd — Pena l ty . 
The claimant of any lien filed as provided herein, 
on the payment of the amount thereof together with 
the costs incurred and the fees for cancellation, shall 
at the request of any persoL interested in the prop-
erty charged therewith cause said hen to be canceled 
of record within ten days from the request, and upon 
failure to so cancel his lien within the time aforesaid 
shall forfeit and pay to the person making the request 
the sum of S20 per day until the same shall be can-
celed, to be recovered in the same manner as other 
debts. i»5S 
38-1-25. A b u s e of ben r ight — P e n a l t y . 
Any person who knowingly causes to be filed for 
record a claim of lien against any property, which 
contains a greater demand than the sum due him, 
with the intent to cloud the title, or to exact from the 
owner or person liable by means of such excessive 
claim of lien more than is due him. or to procure a m 
advantage or benefit whatever, i s guil ty of a misde-
meanor. 1*53 
38-1-26. Ass ignmen t of ben . 
All liens under this chapter shall be assignable as 
other choses in action, and the assignee may com-
mence and prosecute actions thereon in his own name 
in the manner herein provided. 1353 
38-1-27. Preliminary notice — Form of notice — 
Contents of notice — Notice of com-
mencement — County clerks to main-
tain, index file — Payment of fees. 
(1) This section relating to preliminary notices 
does not apply to residential construction or to work 
performed in the development of subdivisions whose 
end use is for residential construction For the pur-
poses of this section, residential construction means 
single family detached housing and multifamily at-
tached housing up to and including fourplexes. and 
includes rental housing 
(2) Except subcontractors who are in privity of con-
tract with an original contractor or except for persons 
performing labor for wages any person claiming, re-
serving the right to claim, or intending to claim a 
mechanic's lien under this chapter for labor, service, 
equipment, or material shall provide preliminary no-
tice to the origins) contractor a s prescribed by this 
section Any person who fails to provide this prelum* 
nary notice has no right to claim a mechanic's lien 
under this chapter. 
(3; The preliminary notice required by this section 
shall be in writing and may be given at any time 
during the course of the project or improvement. 
(4) A person required by this section to give pre-
liminary notice is only required to give one notice for 
each project or improvement, which may include an 
entire structure or a scheme of improvements 
(5"> If the labor, service, equipment, or material is 
furnished pursuant to contracts with more than one 
subcontractor or with more than one original contrac-
tor, the notice requirements must be met with respect 
to the labor, service, equipment, or materia!? fur-
nished to each such subcontractor or original contrac-
tor. 
(6) The person required by this section to give pre-
liminary notice is precluded from making a claim for 
any labor, service, equipment, or material which was 
provided more than 45 days prior to the date the pre-
liminary notice is given. The preliminary notice must 
be given before a notice of lien is filed with the county 
recorder pursuant to Section 38-1-7. 
(7) The preliminary notice under this section shall 
include: 
(h) the name, address, and telephone number 
of the person furnishing the labor, service, equip-
ment, or material; 
(b) the name and address of the person who 
contracted for the famishing of the labor, service, 
equipment, or material; and 
(c) the address of the project or improvement 
or a drawing sufficient to describe the location of 
the project or improvement. 
(8) (a) Service of a preliminary notice is sufficient 
if the notice is deposited in the United States 
mail, certified or registered, re turn receipt re-
quested, postage prepaid. Service of the prelimi-
nary notice by mail is complete upon deposit of 
the certified or registered mail. 
(b> A preliminary notice served by mail may 
be addressed to the original contractor at his 
place of business, or his address as shown on the 
notice of commencement on file with the count} 
clerk as required by Subsections (10) and (Hi . 
(9) The applicability of this section, including the 
waiver of rights or privileges granted or protected by 
this section, may not be varied by agreement. 
(10) Any right to assert a defense of failure to com-
ply with the preliminary notice requirements of this 
section is void unless the original contractor files a 
notice of commencement of the project or improve-
ment with the county clerk for the county or counties 
where the project is located within 30 days after corr -
mencement of the project The notice of commence-
ment shall include the following-
(a) the name and address of the owner of the 
project or improvement; 
(b) the name and address of the original con-
tractor; 
(c) the name and address of the surety provid-
ing any payment bond for the project or improve-
ment, or if none exists, a statement tha t a pay-
ment bond was not required for the work being 
performed; 
(d) the name of the project; and 
(e) the address of the project or improvement 
or ^ drawing sufficient to describe the location of 
the project or improvement. 
(11) The county clerks for t h e individual counties 
of th is s tate shall create and ma in t a in a file for the 
filing and maintenance' of the notices of commence-
men t required under Subsection (10). The file shall be 
cross indexed by the name of the or iginal contractor . 
the n a m e of the project or improvement , and the ad-
dress or location of the project or improvement . The 
count}- clerks shall establish and collect a fee for fi.-
m g a notice of commencement sufficient to pay for the 
cost of t r ea t ing and ma in ta in ing the file The fee es-
tablished and collectec may not be in excess of th-
costs of creat ing and ma in t a in ing such file. l&a* 
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CHAPTER 2 
PRIVATE CONTRACTS 
Section 
14-2-1 Definitions — Payment bond required — 
Right of action — Notice — Attorneys' 
fees 
14-2-2 Failure of owner to obtain payment bond — 
Liability 
14-2-3, 14-2-4 Repealed 
14-2-5 Preliminary notice requirement 
14-2-1. Definitions — Payment bond required — 
Right of action — Notice — Attorneys' 
fees. 
(.1) For purposes of this chapter 
a^V| "Contractor means any person who is or 
may be awarded a contract for the construction, 
alteration, or repair of any building, structure, or 
improvement upon land 
(b' "Owner" means any person contracting for 
construction, alteration or repair of any build-
ing structure, or improvement upon land 
(2' Before any contract exceeding $2,000 m 
amount for the construction, alteration, or repair of 
any building, structure or improvement upon land is 
awarded to any contractor, the owner shall obtain 
from the contractor a payment bond complying with 
Subsection £3 The bond shall become brnoing upon 
the award of the contract to the contractor 
(3) The payment bond shall be with a surety or 
sureties satisfactory' to the owner for the protection of 
a!) persons supplying labor, services, equipment, or 
material in the prosecution of the work provided for 
in the contract in a sum equal to the contract price 
4< A person shall have a right of action on a pa>-
ment bond under this chapter for an} unpaid amount 
due him if 
(a) he has furnished labor, services equip-
ment, or material in the prosecution of the *ork 
provided for in the contract for which ire pav-
ment bond is furnished under this chapter ar i 
(b) he has not been paid in full within 90 days 
after the last day on which he performed the 
labor or service or supplied the equipment or ma-
terial for which the claim is made. 
(5) An action under this section shall be brought in 
a court of competent jurisdiction in the count}- whe~e 
the contract was to be performed and not elsewner* 
The action is barred if not commenced within one 
year after the last day on which the claimant per-
formed the labor or service or supplied the equipmes; 
or material on which the claim is based. The oblige* 
named in the bond need not be joined as a party to the 
action. In any action upon a bond, the court may 
award reasonable attorneys' fees to the prevailing 
party, which fees shall be taxed as costs in the action 
(6) The payment bond shall be exhibited tc ar> 
interested person npon request 
(7) In any suit upon a payment bond under this 
chapter, the court shall award reasonable attorneys' 
fees to the prevailing party. is*s 
14-2-2. Failure of owner to obtain payment 
bond — liability. 
(1) Any owner who fails to obtain a payment bone 
is liable to each person who performed labor or ser-
vice or supplied equipment or materials under the 
contract for the reasonable value of the labor or ser-
vice performed or the equipment or materials fur-
nished up to but not exceeding the contract price 
(2) No action to recover on this liability may be 
commenced after the expiration of one year after the 
day on which the last of the labor or service was per-
formed or the equipment or material was suppLed b; 
the person. 
(3) In an action for failure to obtain a bond the 
court may award reasonable attorneys' fees to the 
prevailing party. These fees shall be taxed as costs in 
the action. 19$$ 
14-2-3,14-2-4. Repealed. is*-
14-2-5. Preliminary notice requirement 
Except subcontractors who are in privity of con-
tract with a payment bond principal or except for per-
sons performing labor for wages, any person fum^r -
ing labor, service, equipment, or material for wn.:h £ 
payment bond claim may be made under this chapter 
shall provide preliminary notice to the payment bond 
principal as prescribed by Section 38-1-27 Anj per-
son who fails to provide this preliminary notice ma;. 
not make a payment bond claim under this chapter 
The preliminary notice must be provided pnor :c 
commencement of any action on the payment bone 
198S 
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58A-la-9. Licenses — Expiration — Notice — Renewal. 
(Ij All licenses issued under this chapter, unless suspended or revoked, 
expire on April 30 of each odd-numbered year. 
(2^  The director shall notify, at least 30 days prior to the expiration date, 
each licensed contractor of the impending expiration Notice shall be given by 
mail addressed to each contractor's last known address, and the notice shall 
enclose an application form for a renewal. 
(3) An applicant for renewal of an existing license, on a form prescribed by 
the division, accompanied by the required fee, filed with the division prior to 
the expiration date, shall authorize operations as a contractor by the licensee 
until actual issuance of the renewal license for the ensuing license period. All 
applications for renewal of licenses shadl be filed with the division not later 
than April 30. Upon failure to file, licenses shall be renewed only upon the 
payment of the regular renewal fee and the established reinstallment fee. Any 
licensee who fails to renew a lapsed license within six calendar months shall 
apply for and receive a new license before he may do business as a contractor. 
History: C. 1953. 58A-la-9. enacted by L. 
1985, ch. 171, $ 2. 
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Rule 4-504. Written orders, judgments and decrees. 
Intent* 
To establish a uniform procedure for submitting written orders, judgments, 
and decrees to the court 
Applicability: 
This rule shall apply to all courts of record and not of record 
Statement of the Rule. 
(1) In all rulings b} a court, counsel for the party or parties obtaining the 
ruling shall within fifteen 15) days, or within a shorter time as the court ma) 
direct file witl the court a proposed order, judgment, or decree in conformity 
with the ruling 
/ (2^  Copies of the proposed findings, judgments, and orders shall be served 
•' upon opposing counsel before being presented to the court for signature unless 
,03 OPERATION OF THE COURTS Rule 4-505 
Sj§ court otherwise orders Notice of objections shall be submitted to the court 
^counsel within (5) days after service. 
NVstipulated settlements and dismissals shall also be reduced to writing 
' /presented to the court for signature within fifteen (15) days of the settle-
Jit 'and dismissal 
?4)aUpon entry of judgment, notice of such judgment shall be served upon 
Apposing party and proof of such service shall be filed with the court All 
dgments, orders, and decrees, or copies thereof, which are to be transmitted 
;er signature by the judge, including other correspondence requiring a re-
j^/f must be accompanied by pre-addressed envelopes and pre-paid postage 
^ 5 ) All orders, judgments, and decrees shall be prepared in such a manner |uf"to show whether the\ are entered upon the stipulation of counsel, the 
Sotion of counsel or upon the court's own initiative and shall identify the 
attorneys of record in the cause or proceeding m which the judgment, order or 
jjgcree is made 
(6) Except where otherwise ordered, all judgments and decrees shall con-
tain the address or the last known address of the judgment debtor and the 
social security number of the judgment debtor if known. 
(7) All judgments and decrees shall be prepared as separate documents and 
shall not include any matters by reference unless otherwise directed by the 
court Orders not constituting judgments or decrees may be made a part of the 
documents containing the stipulation or motion upon which the order is 
based 
(8) No orders, judgments, or decrees based upon stipulation shall be signed 
or, entered unless the stipulation is in writing, signed by the attorneys of 
record for the respective parties and filed with the clerk or the stipulation wras 
madVon the record 
(9)' In all cases where judgment is rendered upon a written obligation to pay 
money and a judgment has previously been rendered upon the same written 
obligation, the plaintiff or plain tiffs counsel shall attach to the new com-
plaint a copy of all previous judgments based upon the same written obliga-
tion. 
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Rule 9 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
Rule 9. Pleading special matters. 
(a^  (1) Capacity. It is not necessary to aver the capacity of a party to sue or 
be sued or the authority of a party to sue or be sued m a representative 
capacin or the lega] existence of an organized association of persons that 
is made a party When a party desires to raise an issue as to the legal 
existence of any party or the capacity of any party to sue or be sued or the 
authority of a part}' to sue or be sued in a representative capacity, he 
shall do so by specific negative averment, which shall include such sup-
porting particulars as are peculiarly within the pleader's knowledge, and 
on such issue the party relying on such capacity, authority, or legal exis-
tence, shall establish the same on the trial. 
(21 Designation of unknown defendant When a party does not 
know the name of an adverse party, he may state that fact in the plead-
ings, and thereupon such adverse party may be designated in any plead-
ing or proceeding by any name, provided, that when the true name of 
such adverse party is ascertained, the pleading or proceeding must be 
amended accordingly. 
(3) Actions to quiet title; description of interest of unknown par-
ties. In an action to quiet title wherein any of the parties are designated 
in the caption as ttunknown," the pleadings may describe such unknown 
persons as "all other persons unknown, claiming any right, title, estate or 
interest in, or lien upon the real property described in the pleading ad-
verse to the complainant's ownership, or clouding his title thereto " 
(b) Fraud, mistake, condition of the mind. In all averments of fraud or 
mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with 
particularity. Malice, intent, knowledge, and other condition of mind of a 
person may be averred generally 
(c) Conditions precedent. In pleading the performance or occurrence of 
conditions precedent, it is sufficient to aver generally that all conditions prec-
edent have been performed or have occurred. A denial of performance or 
occurrence shall be made specifically and with particularity, and when so 
made the party pleading the performance or occurrence shall on the trial 
establish the facts showing such performance or occurrence. 
(d) Official document or ac t In pleading an official document or act it is 
sufficient to aver that the document was issued or the art done in compliance 
with law 
(e) Judgment In pleading a judgment or decision of a domestic or foreign 
court judicial or quasi-judicial tribunal, or of a board or officer, it is sufficient 
to aver the judgment or decision without setting forth matter showing juris-
diction to render it. A denial of jurisdiction shall be made specifically and with 
particularity and when so made the party pleading the judgment or decision 
shall establish on the trial all controverted jurisdictional facts. 
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(f) Time and place. For the purpose of testing the sufficiency of a pleading 
averments of time and place are materia! and shall be considered kk~ al 
o&er averments of materia] matter 
(g)J5pecial damage. When items of special damage are claimed, they shall 
^specifically stated 
(h) Statute of limitations. In pleading the statute of limitations it is not 
necessary to state the facts showing the defense but it may be alleged gener-
ally that the cause of action is barred by the provisions of the statute rebed 
on, referring tc or describing such statute specifically and definitely by section 
"number, subsection designation, if any, or otherwise designating the provision 
relied upon sufficiently clearly to identify it. If such allegation is controverted 
the party pleading the statute must establish, on the trial, the facts showing 
that the cause of action is so barred. 
(i) Private statutes; ordinances. In pleading a private statute of this 
state, or an ordinance of any political subdivision thereof, or a right derived 
from such statute or ordinance, it is sufficient to refer to such statute or 
ordinance by its title and the day of its passage or by its section number or 
other designation in any official publication of the statutes or ordinances The 
court shall thereupon take judicial notice thereof. 
(j) Libel and slander. 
(1) Pleading defamatory matter. It is not necessary in an action for 
libel or slander to set forth any intrinsic facts showing the application to 
the plaintiff of the defamatory matter out of which the action arose; but it 
is sufficient to state generally that the same was published or spoken 
concerning the plaintiff. If such allegation is controverted, the party al-
leging such defamatory matter must establish, on the trial, that it was so 
published or spoken 
(2) Pleading defense. In his answer to an action for libel or slander, 
the defendant may allege both the truth of the matter charged as defama-
tory and any mitigating circumstances to reduce the amount of damages, 
and, whether he proves the justification or not, he may give in evidence 
the mitigating circumstances. 
Compiler's Notes. — Tins rule is substan-
tially similar to Rule 9, FRCP 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Fraud 
—Forgery 
—General accusations 
Insufficient 
Negligence 
—Materiality of representation 
—Misrepresentation 
Not properly pleaded 
Properly pleaded 
Judgment 
—Foreign judgment 
Lack of capacity 
—Failure to raise 
Waiver. 
—Specific negative averment 
Libel and slander 
—Actual harm 
Mistake 
—Mutual mistake. 
Contracts. 
Deeds 
Special damages 
—Accounting 
—Defamation 
—General and special damages 
—Loss of earnings 
—Notice of special damages 
—Punitive damages 
Allegations of fraud. 
Statute of limitations 
—Pleading 
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f:ori" * • 
-Y * * | 
THE COURT This Court, having further considered the 
arguments of counsel as well as the authorities, both 
statutory and case law, cited, is prepared to rule. 
A R-le :I motion requires that this Court consider 
the evidence in the light most favorable to the party 
against: whom the motion is directed. In this instance, J 
the Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment, which j 
motion was argued and denied on the 4th of April of 19 8S 
Neither party memorialized the ruling by filing or 
submitting an order thereon, for this Court to conclude 
that the summary judgment motion was partially granted 
1 when that ruling is not supported by the minute entry and ' 
i 
wi th no transcript of that ruling is too great a leap of j 
| faith for this Court, Ms. Siegler. j 
The Plaintiff in this action in its Complaint has j 
1 asserted threp causes of action. One is lien foreclosure 1 
- against the owner of the property. Two is the quantum 
meruit or unjust enrichment theory. And three is the 
payment bond which is a claim against the material payment 
insurer, United Pacific Insurance Company. 
The Defendant has filed an Answer alleeing affirmative I 
waiver and estoppel and failure to give proper credit and 
denial of the receipt of the materials in cuestion. 
The Plaintiff has established by its evidence that the' 
ADDENDUM, PAGE 1 1 
items involved in electrical contracting were sold to the 
subcontractor, Old Trapper Electric, a subcontractor of 
the Defendant Ink ley. Furthermore, the Plaintiff has 
established that the items were of the type and approxi-
mate quantity necessary for use in the construction of the 
Hunter Sta'rie Center. 
The burden is on the Plaintiff to establish by a 
preponderance of the evidence compliance with Title 14-2-1 
regarding notice to establish by some believable evidence 
that the materials went to and were utilized in the 
project, that a valid lien has been filed in compliance 
with Title 38-1-10 and following, and that when supplying 
materials to a subcontractor with multiple accounts, that 
Title 58-50-10 was complied with, as well as other 
statutory requirements set forth in materialmen lien 
and bonding provisions. 
In this Court's view, the evidence has been 
legally insufficient to survive the Rule 50 motion. I an. 
net persuaded that the Plaintiff has met its burden of 
establishing to a legal sufficiency sufficient evidence tc 
overcome the Rule 50 motion. 
Accordingly, it is this Court's view that the motion 
should be and is granted. 
Mr. Fox, you prepare the appropriate order. 
MR. FOX: I will, your Honor. I would request the 
ADDENDUM, PAGE 12 
Clerk make a transcript of the Court's findings so that 
we could prepare Findings of Fact. 
THE COURT. Very well. I'm sure she has heard the 
request. 
Ccur: -.•_!. be m recess. 
XR FCX: Thank you, your Honor. 
(Whereupon, the proceedings were concluded ) 
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STATE OF UTAH ) 
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I, ANNA M. BENNETT, do hereby certify: 
That I am a Certified Shorthand Reporter, License No. 
220, and one of the official court reporters of the state of 
Utah; that on the 14th day of June, 1989, I attended the 
within matter and reported in shorthand the proceedings had 
thereat; that later I caused my said shorthand proceedings 
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ADDENDUM, PAGE 14 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ASSOCIATED ELECTRIC SUPPLY, 
INC., a Utah Corporation, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
NO. 890735-CA 
SHIRL B. INKLEY, an individual 
d/b/a INKLEY CONSTRUCTION, 
THE CORPORATION OF 
THE PRESIDING BISHOP OF THE 
CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF 
LATTER-DAY SAINTS, and UNITED 
PACIFIC INSURANCE COMPANY 
Defendants and Respondents. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT 
I, Lora C. Siegler, do hereby certify that I mailed, postage 
pre-paid, to the office of Joseph R. Fox, Attorney for Defendants, 
at 9160 South 300 West, Sandy, Utah 84070, one copy each of the 
Brief of Appellant on this 18th day of January, 1990. 
JJU. 
Lora C. Siegler 
